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Maintaining momentum on this issue will be crucial in the context of current peacekeeping reform efforts, as there is no greater risk to the credibility and legitimacy of the UN and its peacekeeping…. Sweta Chakraborty is the host of the Climate and Security podcast and here she interviews Louise Van Schaik, whose research has extensively analyzed the EU's performance in multilateral bodies,…. While the relationship between climate change and violent extremism is not linear, climate change does impose further stress on water and food security, population….
As the debate over climate-related security risks grows, many Pacific Island states are calling for more action by the…. The International Peace Institute is an independent, international not-for-profit think tank with a staff representing more than 20 nationalities, located in New York across from United Nations headquarters. IPI is dedicated to promoting the prevention and resolution of conflicts between and within states by strengthening international peace and security institutions.
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To achieve its purpose, IPI employs a mix of policy research, convening, publishing and outreach. The Global Observatory provides timely analysis on trends and issues related to global security. Skip to content. Therefore, taking into account the diversity of institutional commitments, maritime security can be regarded as a complex issue, due to the difficulty of bringing expectations at various levels together in unison. The proposed typology mentions that in addition to being complex, the concept of Maritime security is also both convergent and divergent.
It is convergent because it involves terminology with multiple meanings which can therefore accommodate distinct epistemic nuances — and also because topics traditionally considered in the context of safety can also affect security. This conceptual broadening that has enabled several themes to converge on the concept of maritime security may be related to similar trends in respect of other concepts such as human security, and even peace-building Gasper Converging on something of general interest may facilitate agreements based on similar interests among stakeholders.
Finally, the proposed typology of maritime security can be seen as divergent. This term is used to show that, while at its core maritime security involves actions at sea that affect all regular navigation, it also involves other issues.
Christian Buerger has proposed four quadrants around maritime security: national security, human security, the environment, and the economical use of the seas. These four quadrants contain sub-topics, some closer to the core and others more peripheral, reflecting interests that may be national or international, short-term or ongoing. Most analysts agree that maritime security encompasses some issues related to inter-state conflict such as piracy or armed robbery, when the incidents occur in state territorial waters and terrorist acts. Trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, smuggling, and human trafficking have also been added.
It is also no longer possible to discuss maritime security while ignoring newer topics such as the exploitation of living resources fishing and bioprospecting , the exploitation of the sea bed, ocean pollution, and natural and human-caused accidents with serious consequences, including climate change. While further from the core, all these issues need to be considered. Each is mainly related to a single quadrant, but many also affect several of them.
This is why I propose to consider maritime security as a complex , convergent and divergent concept. In order to discuss the possibilities of multilateral action for ensuring peace and maritime security, this concept must therefore be delimited further. Fighting against exploitative bioprospecting is quite distinct from fighting against the trafficking of drugs, or the smuggling of contraband.
On the other hand, based on the proposed complex typology, some maritime threats are more localised, and have more limited repercussions than others. For example, illegal fishing in a particular area usually affects only the economy adjacent to it, making this a problem for the coastal state whose law is being flouted. Other threats may have a wider but still limited impact. Some threats have become global, and therefore ask for international intervention.
Some actions have been undertaken, and certain maritime areas are regarded as particularly worrying in terms of maritime security. Piracy off the east coast of Africa, initially around Somalia, has provoked a significant international response.
The Making and Un-Making of a Marine
More recently, the west coast of Africa, known as the Gulf of Guinea, has also attracted more attention, mostly due to cases of armed robbery, but also of piracy. Given this typology and the related examples, it is possible to demonstrate that there are multiple and distinct alternatives for dealing with each of these threats. Some involve major international engagements by multilateral and international organisations , and others more national responses. Given this, I am limiting this analysis only to UN initiatives the most comprehensive level in the complex typology as a means of dealing with a lack of maritime security.
While the 20th century was not the most confrontational in history, it witnessed the outbreak of wars transcending borders, impacting on areas around the globe. The worldwide reach of hostilities led to two conflicts called World Wars for the first time. The age-old desire to regulate the use of force by states was finally attempted. However, the proposed organisational structure was unable to withstand the stresses encountered in subsequent decades Garcia While this first modern experiment in creating a universal organisation of states dedicated to international peace and security did not prosper, it nevertheless established certain precedents in the field of multilateral co-operation for solving conflicts.
While not formally defined as such, Peacekeeping Operations PKOs are now seen as dating back to that period Garcia It was clear that the LN could not muster or guarantee the resources needed to preserve peace. Thus, the great powers began to consider the establishment of a new international organisation.
On 26 June UN , the Charter of San Francisco officially established this international organisation as a new intergovernmental instrument for ensuring international peace and security. This demonstrates the international concern with delimiting inter- and intra-state relations capable of achieving the utopian goal of universal peace.
This was no longer a matter of initiatives or actions by individual states, but rather of shared responsibilities for guaranteeing peace. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
I will use this as a further argument in favour of maritime PKOs. Moreover, the three UN conferences on the Law of the Sea in , and have expanded its mandate to regulating maritime spaces. The UN often tried to address these crises by using non-coercive measures provided for in Article 41 of its Charter.
While the Charter enables the UN to establish its own armed forces, practical problems have prevented this from being implemented. While use of the veto would have paralysed decision-making in the UNSC, the failures of the Military Staff Committee precluded any possibility of implementing the collective security mechanism envisaged in the Charter.
The most important of these instruments were PKOs. Proposals were made for establishing UN Armed Forces or a rapid deployment force, including the proposal for a police force presented by UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie in which served as a model for creating the UN Guards who worked in northern Iraq in , and proposals for the rapid deployment of national military forces set out in the report of the Collective Measures Commission created by section C of Resolution V of the United Nations General Assembly UNGA in But none of these initiatives prospered.
International society, understood as a set of political actors and subjects of law Bull , has come to accept the international protection of peace through an international organisation IO. However, it took time for this perspective to become well understood and settled. Since the advent of the UN, single states or coalitions led by a single state have made various attempts to establish PKOs.
Much of this happened during the Cold War, such as the US action in Grenada, the French interventions in crises in its former colonies in Africa in the s and s, and the British interventions in Ireland in the late s Fontoura Indeed, these actions were not only unilateral, but also lacked the impartiality and neutrality intrinsic to the pursuit of international peace. Published in , it reflects years of experience and many preceding documents including Uniting for Peace, ; An Agenda for Peace, ; Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, ; and the Brahimi Report, This document defines a fundamental characteristic of PKOs, namely their multilateral character; that is, it presupposes a diversity of power and diffused interests pursuing a single objective, namely peacekeeping.
This is confirmed by the collective decision-making process for establishing a PKO. While UN PKOs during the Cold War was limited to maintaining ceasefires and the status quo, these efforts were confined to nations that were on the same ideological side of the Cold War divide. This approach was subsequently ratified by the Capstone Doctrine. During this period, classical PKOs usually faced the difficulty of covert superpower support for the opposing parties, which made it difficult to reduce tensions in conflicts.
As a result, several of these PKOs remained active for decades, until political solutions were worked out between the parties UN Intra-state conflicts increased after the Cold War.
The Making and Un-Making of a Marine by Lawrence Winters
Growing expectations of the UN in the s developed into a crisis of credibility in the s. Initial enthusiasm over the end of the Cold War bolstered the role of the UN, and it was severely affected by the consequences of broadening the scope and intensity of PKOs. High-level UN summits stated clearly that the organisation would play a more active role, and should be able to respond more effectively to new demands. Fresh changes were required, and the UN itself encouraged studies and suggested new directions.
In , Lakhadar Brahimi — then the Algerian minister of foreign affairs — co-ordinated a study group on what the UN needed to do to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its PKOs UN In contrast to the Agenda for Peace, which was a general document about the effective establishment of PKOs, the Brahimi Report as it became known made detailed recommendations for improving UN peacekeeping operations. Although accurate in many of its diagnoses and prognoses, the Brahimi Report saw scant potential for regional organisations contributing to PKOs.
However, since then, this type of PKO has become more prominent. As MacQueen has noted:. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, there are strong forces at the centre pushing peacekeeping out for local attention. Simultaneously, there are peripheral forces tending to pull peacekeeping provision away from direct UN responsibility. The spiralling costs of peacekeeping and the increasing difficulty in enlisting sufficient contributing States makes the regionalization of peacekeeping no less attractive to the UN in the mids than it was in the mids : This trend has been reinforced by others, notably the development of a fifth generation of PKOs, called Hybrid Operations, in which the UN reinforces and ratifies actions led by regional organisations.
Critical thinking about the Brahimi Report may not have gained enough historical distance to state that it was inaccurate in this regard. In this section, I have used a deductive-analytical method to demonstrate that peacekeeping operations are not static instruments, applicable to one type of situation only.
While, at the outset, and without doctrinal consolidation, they were only classical inter-state operations, they have developed into more multidimensional and hybrid approaches, which opens the door to further doctrinal innovations. As noted previously, the UN has assumed the role of regulating the sea.
What Makes Trump Tick
Believing that the codification and progressive development of the law of the sea achieved in this Convention will contribute to the strengthening of peace, security, cooperation and friendly relations among all nations in conformity with the principles of justice and equal rights and will promote the economic and social advancement of all peoples of the world, in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations as set forth in the Charter […] UN While fully acknowledging state sovereignty at sea, this is treated differently from sovereignty on land.
This sovereignty decreases as one moves further away from land until one reaches the high sea, which falls outside Exclusive Economic Zones a maximum of nautical miles. Ships flying the flag of the United Nations, its specialised agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency: The preceding articles do not prejudice the question of ships employed on the official service of the United Nations, its specialised agencies or the International Atomic Energy Agency, flying the flag of the organisation.
But talk in Washington is also that McGurk may be about leave his job soon, perhaps by January A career diplomat with nearly four decades of Middle East experience under his belt, Satterfield has been the acting assistant secretary for near eastern affairs since Pompeo has already called on David Schenker, a Bush-era Pentagon official now of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, to fill the assistant secretary position. For the U. The roughly 2, or 2, American soldiers, diplomats, and contractors in Syria have so far faced few direct threats, and would easily win a conventional battle.
The troops in Syria are so few that they must rely on local allies for key elements of their security, making it hard to guard against a determined enemy in an area crawling with agents and infiltrators—and the situation is even worse in neighboring Iraq. There, much of the security apparatus is run by Iran-friendly Islamists , pro-Tehran militants have seeded eastern Baghdad with ground-embedded rocket tubes pointed at the U. Embassy, and Pompeo has already been forced to abandon the U. Consulate in Basra under Iranian pressure.
Serving U. Understand the cost of that, then do it. The U. Every time the president takes his hands off the wheel, the foreign policy apparatus starts to edge back toward its preferred course of action, which is action. Syria is the most blatant example of this path-dependent pro-intervention bias, in which the American foreign policy bureaucracy strains forward to control, reorganize, or fix the Middle East whenever given more leash to move. But it is a broader, systemic problem that appears to affect much of U. Whereas Obama came to be seen even by his supporters as a maddening micromanager, who would rather let a decision die of old age than entrust it prematurely to a bureaucracy whose instincts he mistrusted, Trump simply drops a piano on the thing he does not like—like that CIA program, or a Syrian nerve gas attack.
As the most powerful man in the world, and not afraid to act like it, Donald Trump has repeatedly shown that he can flip superpower strategy upside down and throw policymakers out of office at the stroke of a pen. Tags: syria , U. Foreign Policy , Trump. Aron Lund is a Swedish writer on Middle Eastern affairs and a fellow at The Century Foundation who has published several books and reports on Syrian politics.
I Understand. Download EN EN. Having thus confirmed that it was an actual place in actual trouble, Trump stormed onto Twitter: President Bashar al-Assad of Syria must not recklessly attack Idlib Province. Sign up for updates.