Other Marxist approaches argue that the mature Marx completely broke with Hegel. By contrast, this book offers a wide-ranging and innovative understanding of Hegel as an empirically informed theorist of the social, political, and economic world. It proposes a movement 'from Marx to Hegel and back', by exploring the intersections where the two thinkers can be read as mutually complementing or even reinforcing one another.
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With a particular focus on essential concepts like recognition, love, revolution, freedom, and the idea of critique, this new intervention into Hegelian and Marxian philosophy unifies the ethical content of Hegel's philosophy with the power of Marx's social and economic critique of the contemporary world. Gallen, Switzerland III. In the last two decades, new interpretations of Hegel and a renewed interest in the diagnostic power of Marx's writings have challenged many of the established assumptions and made a full reassessment of that key theoretical nexus necessary.
This volume, which brings together up-and-coming scholars and some of the best experts in the field, is a major contribution towards that goal. Collectively, the seek to install a materialist Hegel; an always Hegelian Marx; a formation of critical theory driven by the force of the negative and struggles for recognition; and, above all, for tomorrow's socialism in which social freedom and democratic self-determination might come to be.
At best what can be achieved is a mere balancing or overlapping of fundamentally separate self- interests rather than a unity in something truly common. The inherent relationship between reflective rationality and an atomistic political community finds its religious counterpart, according to Hegel, in the Jewish separation of God and man. Thus reflective rationality is bound up not only with the separation of human and human, self and other, as reflected in the society of Rome but is also integral to the separation of finite and infinite.
Furthermore, because the Jews projected the universal or divine aspect of the self outside into the beyond and submitted to the dictates of a law com- ing from that beyond, he sees the religion as bound up with the further sepa- ration of law and being, of what in Greek society had been united in the being of the individual. In this sense Hegel saw Judaism also as a religion of posi- tivity, of unfreedom, involving the submission to a law given and external to the self rather than generated from within, just as he had earlier criticized Christianity for its positivism.
In spite of his idealization of ancient Greece, and in spite of his concerns about the negative effects of reflective thinking, he recognizes even at this early stage that such thinking is bound up with the principle of freedom. While in its negative sense thought had torn the individual away from the unity she experienced in her ethical substance, such a tearing free also had a liberating effect. No longer bound by nature to their ethical substance, and accepting its demands in an unreflective manner, individuals had to find a rational confirmation of what is right.
But reflective thought itself was incapable of generating such a content of right. The Roman commitment to the universal that lay over against their natural self, the abstract ego and the equally abstract universality of the state that held them all together, was clearly an unsatisfactory basis of right and of commu- nity for Hegel. Indeed, it posits a new division within the self, between reason and emotion. And it is in love that he finds such an overcoming.
This is because love captures a deeper unity of existence, a unity of self and other, consciousness and being, finite and infinite, that is primordial and from which reflective thought has alienated itself. According to this theory, the experience of being separate from the world and of viewing it as a neutral, external object—the standpoint of modern consciousness—is deriva- tive and corruptive of a more primordial identity that exists in nature.
And it is the condition of the modern subjectivity that, in its very being, it is constituted by a rupture from this primordial Identity. Reflective thought itself is incapable of capturing the deeper unity of existence because it is constituted by the separation of subject from object, of concept and being. Hence it must be a different faculty or mode of know- ing, an intuitive one, that grasps the deeper unity. It must be a knowing comprised by unity of reason and emotion, of mind and body. Rather, love is the experience of the harmony of mind and body, of thought and being, of con- sciousness and existence, of reason and emotion.
But it speaks in the language of emotion rather than in the language of concepts. Love is a transcendence of the position of reflective rationality, a refinding or reexperiencing of a primordial experience of unity that had been lost due to the separative influence of reflective rationality. It is the overcoming of the sub- ject-object divide.
What is so significant about this conception of unity, as opposed to the unity manifest in societies governed by custom, such as ancient Greece, is that love is a coming back to unity after the suffering of diremption. And because of this, love is a unity of acute awareness. It is the self-consciousness of the unity, a self-consciousness that is felt.
And most significantly, because it is a self-consciousness achieved after separation, love is to be compatible with the principle behind that separation, the principle of freedom implicit in reflective thought. As this unity, and as the tran- scendence of the negative separations of reflective rationality, love is to be the ultimate realization of the principle of freedom. Love is the overcoming of an authority that sets itself over against actual being and the transcendence of a morality founded on mastery.
It was the figure of Jesus himself that was the inspi- ration for Christian virtue, for he was the concrete embodiment of it. In Jesus, the disposition of love is the unity that grounds the action, just as in traditional morality the law is the ground. This is no dom- ination, no response to an external command, for the action emanates from a unified self, at peace with itself. The sensuous side of the self is not repressed in the name of moral fulfilment but is engaged as precisely the motivation for that fulfilment.
Nor is it based on a particular inclination for one person, making the fidelity dependent upon constancy of desire. Nor indeed is it a question of a fortuitous correspondence between the moral rule of fidelity and particular desire for one person an accidental balancing of the universal and the particular. Love integrates any competing desires and thus resolves moral conflict.
Love furthermore overcomes the inevitable clash of duties that emerges under rule-bound morality. For if moral rules or commands are considered as absolutes, in the multifaceted reality of concrete situations we will be faced with the paradoxical situation of having a plurality of absolutes. If this is dealt with by ranking specific duties as to which is most important, the lower duties take on the status of vices.
Its external shape may be modified in infinite ways; it will never have the same shape twice. It is this love, this unity of self, that informs the practice of virtue, that allows for the many-sidedness of the situation and calls forth an action. Rather than consciously invoking one absolute and imposing it on particular circumstances, thereby destroying other absolutes that might also find some rights therein, the virtuous action represents a fusion of the universal and the particular in life.
Love, then, as the fusion of law and inclination, is meant to overcome the abstract form of theories of moral law, without transgressing the rational con- tent of that law. The notion of virtue as a modification of love finds a way to reconcile sensuous being with ethical action. It humanizes the morality of Kant without compromising the moral seriousness of his project, the serious- ness of what he expected from us as rational beings.
The rational con- tent of law is no longer set over against being. Rather it now exists as the real harmony of reason and being that love represents.
Reconcilability constitutes an escape from the inherent divisiveness entailed in rights-based justice. Reconcilability on the contrary wants to give up the notion of a right as something held against another. Only then can one treat the other from a disposition of love; only then can one feel the true bond with the other that transcends the atomistic relation. A heart thus lifted above the ties of rights, disentangled from everything objective, has nothing to forgive the offender, for it sacrificed its right as soon as the object over which it had a right was assailed, and thus the offender has done no injury to any right at all.
Such a heart is open to rec- onciliation, for it is able forthwith to reassume any vital relationship, to re- enter the ties of friendship and love, since it has done no injury at all to life in itself. On its side there stands in the way no hostile feeling, no conscious- ness, no demand on another for the restoration of an infringed right, no pride which would claim from another in a lower sphere, i.
But if one withdraws from this sys- tem of justice, from the profanity of the public world, if one stops making claims on others, then there will no longer be feelings of resentment, hostil- ity, and pride to deal with. But already, in this conception of love, we can see that its character is bound up with a morality of retreat from the modern world. It is impossible for love to find any existence on the terrain of atomistic individuals who express themselves in private property. The standpoint of atomism already presupposes the moment of reflective separation from self and community.
Reflective rationality is the knife that severs, that cuts into and distances us from any previous experience of unity we might have had.
And private prop- erty is the expression of that separated self, and its nature considered only as appetite and idiosyncrasy. What the lovers genuinely share as a unity cannot be the relation to the external, dead objects that belong to them. As a living relation, love can- not penetrate the lifeless world of things. Thus to find unity again love must go behind the separative principle of reflective thought and its expression in private property. Unlike the unity of individuals in ancient Greek society, in the shared ethical substance that con- stitutes their being, the unity of love is implicit and undeveloped, lying beneath the actual existence of individuals in the world of property relations.
To attain the unity of love, then, is necessarily to strip away the world of property that hides and smothers the true relation to the other. The purity of the union could only be preserved by withdrawal. Nevertheless, by such a retreat, the early Christians could find the unity they were looking for. For Hegel, Jesus is not to be understood literally as the son of a transcendent God, but as representing the unity of the finite and the infinite, the idea that there is an infinite principle that exists in this life, a principle of unity with which we can come into contact and through which we can find the deeper truth and meaning of existence.
But because individuals were so broken from any experience of the infinite in the Roman world, because they could not find any divine in their own selves, they required the figure of Jesus as a way of coming to consciousness of the divine within, as an intermediary step in the achievement of genuine love. Faith in Jesus is this intermediary step. But such a recognition presupposes also a sensing of the infinite in oneself. Jesus is the concrete embodiment of an existence that is separated and over against us, and yet that is implicitly within us.
This final stage is an achieving of independence from the objective existence of Jesus. The culminating relationship that Jesus sought with his friends was that complete overcoming of the subject-object, self-other separation in love. A further illustration of this notion of unity is found in the unity of lovers.
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The lovers are separated only in the sense of their individuation as mortal bodies. But even this they strive to over- come in the act of love. Love entails the encountering and overcoming of differences in the other, a mutual giving up of personality.
System Error Occurred.
The more differences, the more particularities the lovers encounter in one another, the more aspects of them- selves they can reunify and the deeper love can become. Love, as an experience of the infinite, is an infinite that can live only in and through the finite. Even as each member of the community must die, the bond of love that unites them will live on. And it is this bond that gives truth and meaning to a mortal existence. And in portraying it with the beauty and the feeling that he does, it is clear that he has a profound investment in the notion that it might have worked.
But already in the analysis we can see the seeds of its failure. For in retreating behind the world of private property relations, behind the self of reflective rationality that knows only its own idiosyncrasies and differences, love fails truly to overcome reflective reasoning. Rather it turns its back upon the latter. We have already seen that the community of love depended fundamentally on a retreat from the world of private property relations that dominated the early Christian era.
Because there was no space for love to express itself in the world of things, where one encounters only the idiosyncrasy of different selves, the preservation of the bond of love required an ethic of withdrawal. The clash between the world of Christian love and the world dominated by private property relations has been emphasized by some commentators as the chief cause of the failure of the community.
By dismissing the world as polluted, they ironically gave it tremendous importance. The problem of withdrawal, however, was not in itself the ultimate cause of the failure of the community. For the early Christians, in spite of this with- drawal, did have a positive life. They defined themselves by common owner- ship of goods, and the love of Jesus that bound them together expressed itself in their love for each other and in the single activity of spreading the faith, with its shared pleasures in praying, believing, and hoping.
The real cause of the failure of the community thus was not so much withdrawal as it was the deeper antagonism between love and reflective rationality within the modern self. Ultimately, the escape from the divisiveness of reflective rationality and its expression in private property could not be sustained by a strategy of with- drawal.
For reflective reasoning was not simply an external, governing factor in the world; it had penetrated their very selves, and it is this deeper penetra- tion, this irrevocable change in the self of the modern individual, that was the chief cause of the failure of the community of love. We have already considered how love was a rational emotion, a transcen- dence of the position of reflective thought because it is a real capturing of the unity of life, of which reflective thought had been incapable. Nevertheless, reflective rationality remains a reality for the subject who participates in a rela- tion of love.
In the eyes of reflective rationality, love is merely an emotion, something subjective, the other of thought. The reason imbedded in love feels this inadequacy, feels that it is conditioned by reflective thought in this way. If it is to be a true knowledge of the whole, then it knows that it must bring reflection into the experience of the unity.
Reflective understanding, with all the oppositions it entails, has emerged as a part of the truth of life and must be accounted for. How does love deal with the reality of reflective rationality and address its claims so that it can bring that rationality into the unity? It does so through the objectification of the feeling of love in a way that can satisfy the reflective understanding of the truth and reality of love; it renders love a knowable object. Thus the religious object is to be the objectification of the subjective experience of the infinite.
Religion, and not philosophy, is to be the completion of the knowledge of love, its fulfillment, and preservation. Religion is a rational objectification of the experience of the divine in life. But we are dealing in religion with a different kind of reason. It is not the same as a conceptual abstraction. It is not the reason of reflective understand- ing for which every object is a thing that can be united with others only under an abstract category, by means of a barren universal. It is through the intellect in its imaginative use that the separation between reflection and emotion is overcome and that the truth of the religious object can be comprehended.
For the first Christians, the religious object was an immediate objectifi- cation of the feeling of love, a symbol of the unity of life. While they could not attain such objectification in the world around them, in relations that had been so despiritualized, according to them, they did achieve it in religious worship. He was the image of the unity, of the pure life in which believ- ers implicitly felt the truth of their own life. And it was through their imagi- native faculty that they could recognize him as such, that they could, even if it be unconsciously, know the unity between themselves and him.
But the object was inadequate, because they focused on the fact of his separate individuality, on that which was irrelevant to the truth of Jesus.
Love and politics, re-interpreting Hegel | Alice Ormiston
By their understanding they saw him as separate from their own selves, but by love they felt his true reality as the unity of divine and human, law and being, self and other. The resurrection of Jesus was a sign of the genuine union of spirit and body, the overcoming of the finite human form as a fundamentally exclusive particularity. The real truth of Jesus was his unity with life, the unity of the finite and the infinite, of this life with the divine. And this truth was realized in the living bond of the finite human community.
The finite Jesus had to die, for it was not he himself that was the unity of God and human, of spirit and body; rather he only represented that. The personal, individual Jesus was not in the end what was to be immortalized, but his existence as the unity of love, the spirit of the whole that transcends the form of separate individuality a form indeed imposed by reflection and that goes on living in the finite com- munity of which he had been a part.
And with his death and resurrection, the individuals of the community could come to comprehend this. The resur- rected Jesus was a better sign of the unity that Jesus represented, of his real existence as the love of the finite community, which enabled the members of his community to make the final transition to the higher truth, to the fully developed knowledge of love. However, the religious object, the objectification of the knowledge of love, had an immanent tendency to become positivistic, to be understood as an external bond uniting them. Ironically, this tendency was partly a product of the temporary success of the community and it points to another intrinsic difficulty in sustaining a community of love—the problem of size.
It has already been discussed how a truly developed love entailed the encountering and overcoming of the differences in the other. The intensity and completeness of such a developed love means that it is exclusive and indif- ferent to others; it necessarily restricts itself to a small number of people.
Yet the task of the Christians was to extend love to others, to proselytize and bring more people into the spirit of the community. As the group expanded there could be no hope of work- ing through individual differences and incorporating them into a higher unity. The undeveloped nature of this love was what caused the Christians to seek an external source of unity.
They remained attached to the memories of the individual, his activities and his death. They could not sustain the certainty of the truth of love without clinging to the historical, fac- tual reality of Jesus as the criterion for the recognition of their love. Rather than simply the love uniting them, they found in the religious object a factual reality, a common master and teacher, to bind them together.
The divine was something given to them, an alien spirit, an external master, not what they themselves had become, not the true realization of freedom. It remains ambiguous whether, for Hegel, any relationship of love, no matter how developed, could be strong enough to withstand the crystallizing power of reflective rationality.
Reflective thought is inherently incapable of comprehending love. Furthermore, as the knowledge of the Absolute at the level of feeling, the bond of love in the family only ultimately finds its vindication through the rational knowledge achieved at the level of the state. Hence while Hegel does point to the problem of size as a central one in the demise of the Christian community, while it is clear that a true community of love must be small and developed in nature, a look at the later work confirms that the deeper antagonism that love could not resolve is the antagonism of reflective thought.
The early Christians did find the objectification of their love in the resur- rected Jesus. They were capable of understanding the truth of that symbol as their love given shape. But this is only because they were less intellectual than we. Their imagination was more capable of finding in the resur- rected Jesus the true unification of spirit and body, feeling and objectivity, and thus of satisfying the rational self.
But even for them the cleft in the symbol between God and man was there, so the grasp on the unity was very tentative. The longing for religion, for a completion of the sense of unity with life, remained. The continuance of the opposition between God and man experienced by the early followers of Jesus has plagued the entire history of the Christian church, who in its consciousness, if not in its feeling, has seen God variously as friendly, hating, or indifferent to the world, but always as opposed. And as we grew more intellectual, the incapacity to see any spiritual truth in life was extended to our incapacity to see it in the religious object.
The opposition between God and human in the symbol was deepened by the imposition of reflective thought, until that, too, became simply a spiritless object. While love did constitute an overcoming of the negative divisions of reflective rationality, it was never a complete overcoming. Because reflective rationality ultimately separates itself from love and stands outside it, unable to comprehend or do justice to the deeper truth of existence, love cannot finally transcend that rationality.
Yet this reason, and its centrality to the modern subject, cannot be denied. The fate of the Christian community appears to be of tragic dimensions, reflecting the fundamental clash between love and reflective rationality in the modern self, and the apparent triumph of the latter, with all of the loss that this entails.
For Hegel, however, this clash and this triumph are not ultimate. While he must turn his back on the notion of a community of love, this rejec- tion is not, in the end, an abandonment of the truth of love but only an aban- donment of its immediate form. Love now becomes only the beginning point. To reclaim life, to actualize its fundamental unity, is to be a task of the will. It is in this early essay that Hegel is being forced to come to grips with the modern principle of will.
For will is precisely what makes its emergence with the reflective separation of thought from nature, of individual from ethical substance, and with the concomitant demand of the individual for self-determination. For will is the self-assertion of the individual that legitimizes itself according to the notion that we are ratio- nal, thinking beings.
And the assertion of self in private property, which appears so inimical to the bond of love, is the first, most primitive expres- sion of that will. In his mature work, then, Hegel will not only reluctantly acknowledge the will, as he does here, but will actively embrace it as a mode of realization of the Absolute.
The drive of the feudal consciousness in Phenomenology toward a unity with its objective world, the achievement of reconciliation between the judging and the acting conscience in that same work, the expression of the modern will in private property and in the subsequent manifestations that Hegel traces in Philosophy of Right, the need of that will to objectify its certainty of itself in the world, and the drive of the individual of civil society towards the knowledge of its unity with others, all these can only be understood if the will already has some deeply rooted conviction of its own inherent significance, of its implicit unity with the world and with other individuals around it.
And these convic- tions presuppose the knowledge of love. For as we have seen, love is precisely the knowledge of the unity of self and other, of self and world, and of self with an infinite principle. Thus while the will, in its very coming into being, may have separated itself from the knowledge of love, it is nevertheless unconsciously driven by it. The harmony of law and being, mind and body, experienced in love, is totally disrupted by this consciousness.
It loses the truth that love had discovered in being. Thus, by he has come to consider that if there is to be any possibility of a spiritual life for modern individuals, of something beyond the relations of dead objectivity and ethics of mastery that are implicitly tied to reflective thought, it must have a philo- sophical comprehension that can transcend the standpoint of that thought and its negative implications.
In an age of reason, philosophy must illuminate the richness of life, show the individual the significance of her particular indi- vidual experiences by relating them to the Absolute. Like the poetry of the Greeks, and the resurrection of Jesus for the early Christians, philosophy must cognize for the modern the unity of self and world and of finite and infinite. But this is far from suggesting that philosophy constitutes a replacement for the experience of spirituality that we saw with love.
Rather the philosophy Hegel is seeking to conceptualize here is one that incorporates the intuitive knowledge of love and provides it with a conceptual expression or element that will shield it from the negative, reductionist effects of a merely abstract thinking. This is a philosophy rooted in intuition, that provides a conceptual fulfillment to that intuition that will ultimately lead to its vindication. Only then will the problem that reflective rationality poses to love—the problem of the separation from and eclipse of intuitive knowledge—be solved. That is, the conceptualization must not be made from the reflective standpoint, for that would see the knowledge that exists in being, the knowledge of love, as a merely subjective and finite experience.
The concept is not something differ- ent from the experience of being, which conditions and dominates it. The Ego is asserted to be the Absolute and must bring the emotion under its sway. Here the I does not need to regard its objective being as the antithe- sis to its freedom, as that from which it must act completely independently, but as that which contains the same truth as itself, a truth that exists in sensi- ble form. But he inevitably slips back into the reflective stance, separating the Ego from its drive and advocating a relation of com- mand to its own being.
For Hegel, on the contrary, one must begin by taking up the transcendental standpoint. It is not an abstract reflection on the Absolute as object. Rather the philosopher actually engages with the experience of the Absolute, because that experience is the knowledge, just as we have had with love before.
Hegel appears merely to have substituted the idea of a philosophical concept attached to the knowledge of intuition, for the previous satisfying of intellect through the reli- gious symbol. He appears merely to have rehabilitated conceptual thinking by attaching it to intuition, whereas before he had seen it as inherently destruc- tive of intuitive knowledge. There is, however, a significant difference. For whereas love constituted the highest standpoint of knowing, the transcenden- tal intuition is merely the beginning.
Thus it is not in the transcendental intuition per se that we have the final knowl- edge of the Absolute, but in philosophy as a system. Furthermore the object world was for Fichte simply the other posited by the Absolute against which it could begin to come to self- consciousness, and thus it is the side of the subject that is privileged in his sys- tem; the subject must prove its underlying identity with the object world by a one-sided process of mastery. In other words, the judgment does actually capture a truth about nature itself.
Nature is not dead being, inert matter, but also the movement of subjectivity, purposive self-overcoming, albeit at an unconscious level. But how can Schelling assume such a view of nature without falling into the problem of dogmatism that all the post-Kantian idealists are so aware of, of claiming knowledge of an objective being without accounting for the con- tribution of consciousness to that knowledge? The answer is that knowledge for Schelling is not something foreign, added on to Nature, but an emana- tion of nature itself, indeed the very telos of nature.
Hence we have here a teleological treatment of the development of nature and intelligence, as the self-positing of the Identity in existence toward its own self-consciousness. It is in this idea of a teleological or developmental tracing, then, that Hegel sees the potential for comprehending the Absolute in the experience of ordinary consciousness. From Christianity to Conscience If the Absolute is self-positing, if it posits itself in an objective and a sub- jective form, in nature and in intelligence, toward its own self-comprehension, then, according to Hegel, philosophy can trace this self-unfolding, can trace the Identity as it exists in each moment and situate each moment in relation to the Absolute as a totality.
One accompanies the Identity in its own self- positing, first, following Schelling, in its visible form as nature. The manifold of nature is comprehended as the striving of the Absolute toward reflection on itself in visible form, and thus there is an evolutionary development of being from its first existence in inorganic nature, toward an increasingly centralized self-striving in the organic activity of plants, then in the self-feeling of ani- mals, and finally in the consciousness of the human, the being who reflects nature to itself and thus begins to bring the Absolute to self-consciousness.
At first humans do not find their unity with nature but, from the subject- object division which characterizes consciousness, take nature as something separate and distinct. It is in self-consciousness, in reflection away from nature and back onto their own self, that we have the beginning of a rational reuni- fication with nature.
Through the experience of its own self as activity, as sub- ject, self-consciousness will gradually come to find itself as the conscious activity that parallels precisely what has gone on unconsciously in nature. The Absolute as self-consciousness emerges out of the unconscious Absolute of nature and wills its own existence. It will construct consciously the rational structure of itself, and it will find that structure mirrored in nature. Nature is thus the ground and confirmation of the Absolute as self-consciousness.
And self-consciousness in its self-unfolding consciously constructs what in Nature had been unconsciously working therein. What this presupposes is that the Absolute ultimately achieves its goal of self-knowledge, ultimately comes to know itself both in self and in nature and thus is its own rational self-grounding. The philosophical system, then, is the final emanation of an Absolute that seeks rational self-comprehension.
The philosopher follows the unfolding of the Absolute in both these worlds of nature and humanity and comprehends the unity of both of them in the Absolute as a totality.
The transcendental intuition is precisely the Absolute in the moment of its existence, the conscious expression of an uncon- scious activity, which then goes beyond itself and finds its ultimate verification in its relation to the whole. But now, in conjuction with the philosophical system, it is a knowledge that can achieve a philosophical comprehension and justification.
In this new idea of a system, Hegel seems to believe that reflective thought can be managed by being brought into conjunction with intuition and satisfied by the truth expressed in the philosophical system as a whole. Thus can its negative effects on the knowledge of the Absolute, the knowledge of love, be dealt with, without at the same time denying or refusing the principle of reflective thought itself. Hegel spent a number of years in Jena, through lecture courses and in coordination with Schelling, working out the details of this philosophical system.
The democratic intent that he had believed to be implicit in their philosophy, the intent to give credence to the world of expe- rience by revealing it as the Absolute in existence, seemed marred by an increasingly evident elitism. In focusing on unity in experience from the transcendental standpoint, Hegel still has failed truly to address the fundamental problem characterizing the modern consciousness—the radical breach between self and nature. The fact is that even if the experience of unity could have a conceptual expression that would satisfy the modern individual of its truth, that individual is alienated even from the experience of the unity by the standpoint of reflective thought that has come to dominate him.
It is not that this consciousness is incapable of experiencing a unity such as love, or the knowledge of the transcendental intuition, but that in its reflection it becomes alienated from that unity. The taking up of the standpoint of modern consciousness and its separation from being must be the initiating point for the system. In other words, it is to see how consciousness comes to the transcendental intuition as the genuine truth of its existence.
In the method of Phenomenology, thus, we begin with reflective consciousness, which has a particular idea of the truth according to which it operates. We merely observe how this consciousness, through its experience with this idea, discovers the flaw or contradiction therein and moves on to a new view of the truth, which incorporates the previous insight. Thus the method is meant to illustrate a log- ical necessity in the movement of reflective consciousness toward the establish- ment of a higher truth. Such limited subgroups not only ensure that their members' particular interests attain adequate political representation, but also afford members the opportunity to develop a concrete and vital experience of unity with their fellow members, thus [End Page ] enabling the principle of love to Access options available:.
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