In addition, while DHS has been successful in addressing the flow of cargo through most border crossing points and major seaports, there are many, many other avenues by which a determined sub-state group could move radiological material into the country. When is the risk-based resourcing decision made that a certain level of preparedness is good enough? And is that level acceptable to Congress and the public? Those partner nations who have major seaports and airports that move cargo to the United States are very sensitive about the impact of any additional regulatory process on their economy.
Inspecting every cargo ship sailing to the United States for radiological material costs money. On the other hand, some congressional politicians have demanded percent screening of all in-bound US cargo and personnel to eliminate any chance of moving a nuclear weapon past the ports. The third mission area is response to the threat, including those capabilities necessary to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs after an incident has occurred.
I probably do not need to go into great detail here, as many are familiar with the National Response Framework NRF and the role of the federal government here. NASA gets involved if the response is for an incident involving the failure of a USG satellite that is powered by a nuclear reactor. DHHS would be supporting all medical response to any radiological or nuclear incident with its Strategic National Stockpile and other assets. In addition, there would be a focused effort on determining the origin of nuclear material through technical forensics, not only to attribute the blast to a particular agent but also to attempt to identify and interdict any possible additional nuclear threats following the first incident.
Both DoE and DoD have nuclear forensics capabilities. DoE supports nuclear forensics missions prior to a terrorist nuclear detonation, while DoD focuses on the post-detonation assessment. Much of the needed support would not be technical; rather, there would be a great demand for medical response, security, and logistics capabilities. Certainly radiological and nuclear technical experts would be required. DoD, in particular, would play a significant role given its ability to move and command large numbers of personnel in a very short period of time.
The scale of destruction of any nuclear detonation would certainly require that intense application of manpower. The last mission area — recovery — addresses those capabilities necessary to assist communities affected by an incident to recover effectively over the long-term.
This step, identified as Emergency Support Function 14 in the NRF, is not specific to nuclear or radiological events, but certainly in such an event, the USG would address many issues required to restore a community back to pre-incident status. Perhaps the most significant issue of a nuclear or radiological event would be the time required to fully recover from the radiological contamination, which could take decades, depending on the particular isotopes involved.
As an example, we can certainly look at the Japanese efforts in responding to the challenges involving the recent Fukushima reactor melt-down and envision similar steps with regard to an American response to any nuclear detonation within its borders. But the desired balance between the long-term threat of radiological hazards and ever-present political desires to minimize public risk need to be clearly defined and addressed. The real challenges for state and local emergency managers include directing resource allocation and prioritization, working with the federal government, and managing expectations.
In April , more than personnel from federal, state and local agencies and the private sector participated in a five-day homeland security exercise in Philadelphia. The participants thought it was a great experience, considering the size and scope, the diversity of agencies, and skills of players. It offered an opportunity for the state and city to gain valuable experience on recovery operations, and several areas of improvement were identified. This could be a great example for other states and cities to develop their recovery process prior to the involvement of federal agencies.
One of the reasons for this current state of affairs is that having the intent to become a nuclear-weapon-owning state is not the same thing as having the capability to build and use nuclear weapons. This statement applies to terrorist organizations even more than nation-states seeking to develop nuclear weapons. It is not easy to obtain or build a nuclear weapon, to determine how to employ a nuclear weapon, and then transport the device across the oceans without discovery and successfully detonate it within a city.
As the complexity of these steps increases and more people are involved, the footprint of these groups increases in visibility. This allows the USG a number of opportunities to intercept and defeat any group attempting to obtain these weapons. The more sophisticated the terrorists get and the more casualties they want to cause, the easier it is to catch them.
There are numerous federal agencies involved in the preparation for such a contingency, and probably billions of dollars spent each year on their individual projects. But the important part of public policy is evaluating the overall success of efforts to determine whether changes are necessary or whether the effort is no longer needed. In this case, the actual metrics of success are unclear, if anyone is in fact trying to assess the effectiveness of the strategy at all.
Part of the difficulty is that it is difficult to identify the actual scope of and monetary investments made in each area of the federal efforts, so it is difficult to state whether federal preparations are in fact adequate to address this particular challenge. Another challenge is that it is very unclear what the measures of success are.
That is to say, were there no terrorist incidents because all sub-state group efforts were interdicted, or were there no terrorist incidents because no sub-state groups were really trying? What is the baseline, if there are in fact no terrorist groups actively attempting to gain a nuclear capability? How do you determine which projects are performing well and whether others are not value-added? Do we really need to equip every mile of US border, every port of entry, and every city with radiation monitors?
While in the past we have focused on nuclear weapon-owning states and sub-state groups, countries building nuclear reactors become increasingly important potential targets to monitor as well. It all depends on the level of effort desired. On the other hand, not paying enough attention to the threat will have political costs.
For instance, in , the Defense Science Board made a series of recommended actions to reduce vulnerabilities to weapons of mass destruction that offered very high payoff at relative low cost. Because the city lacked the funding and expertise to address this kind of threat, DHS funded the design, development, and deployment of sensitive radiological monitors and cameras throughout the city and tested them in several exercises.
If this pilot project were successful, it would be exported to other cities. So after a three-year effort, probably due to the exorbitant cost of the project, 21 the decision was made to terminate the program after and not expand it to other cities. But sustaining this extensive capability throughout the year does not appear to be an affordable proposition, considering the need to address other existing and more probable threats.
However, in , Rep. Peter King R-NY sponsored a provision to continue and expand the effort. It remains unclear what the future of this initiative will be and when if it will eventually end. In his book Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? Brian M. Jenkins points out how the threat of nuclear weapons has been exaggerated by nuclear weapon analysts and political officials. In his book, he admits to have focused as a defense analyst on the relative threat of nuclear weapons and terrorism in the s, instead of the absolute threat of nuclear terrorism in comparison to other, more probable public dangers.
Because of the nature of nuclear weapons cataclysmic, massively destructive and general fear of terrorism, people give into their fears and expect the worst to occur. As a result of expectations that the federal government should protect the public against the threat of unconventional nuclear attacks, there is a federal strategy in place.
This strategy was developed by a number of policy makers across several government agencies, and is implemented by specific federal agencies with directed agendas and budgets. Congress has an inherent role in deciding how much money goes to this effort, in its review of all government activities. There are numerous advocates for developing additional measures to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, with varied levels of influence.
Further studies of these actors would highlight additional issues and challenges to how the federal government addresses this public policy issue. Federal efforts within prevention and protection are probably more extensive than the response and recovery, perhaps because the public and Congress expects the US government to prevent nuclear terrorist incidents from happening, rather than allocating large amounts of resources for responding to a nuclear terrorist incident.
There is a significant challenge in trying to protect every aspect of US territory from terrorists obtaining or transporting special nuclear material, largely due to the sheer size of the United States and continued growth of nuclear technologies across the globe. There have been no specific metrics identified to state what exactly the US goals are and if they are on track or even achievable. This is not a unique problem — developing a resource-based strategy with measurable goals is difficult, and yet no one wants to be accused of doing nothing.
So yes, there is a significant federal effort in place, but is it adequate? The challenge, as it is with all public policy discussions, is identifying the actors and their motivations, developing an agenda and legitimizing the program, getting the program funded and executed, and finally evaluating the program to determine whether it is meeting its goals.
Only then can we determine whether the policy has been successful and whether more needs to be done. Al Mauroni is a senior policy analyst with the Air Force. A former Army officer, he has over twenty-five years experience in military chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological CBRN defense policy and program development. He is the author of six books and more than two-dozen articles on the topic. Naval Press Institute, Mauroni can be contacted at mauronia yahoo. The views expressed in this presentation are solely those of the author, and do not reflect the views of the Department of Defense or US Air Force.
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Implementing the Policy The federal government uses a combination of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and combating terrorism tactics in its strategy to counter terrorist WMD threats. Given the potentially catastrophic consequences, even a small probability that terrorists getting and detonating a nuclear bomb is enough to justify urgent action to reduce the risk. And this was for one city. Unknown to how many other cities this initiative might expand. To summarize, in addition to the intensive verification procedures that should be in place in an Arctic Treaty to ensure compliance with its conditions, the zonal states should also work together to jointly survey the Arctic.
This would be a significant CBM, as well as providing the functional benefit of being better able to cover the millions of kilometres of the Arctic through a pooling of resources. Today machines hold the place formerly occupied by the jawbone, the elephant, armour, the long bow, gun powder, and latterly, the submarine.
This is to say that decreasing nuclear weapons in the Arctic should not culminate in a race towards developing a new weapon of mass destruction or a build-up of conventional forces in the region. It recommends that the geographical limits of the treaty encompass the entire territories of Canada, Greenland-Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. In addition to the land, airspace, adjacent seas, including the Arctic Ocean, seabed, continental shelves and international waters should all be covered by the treaty.
Nuclear-Weapon-Free in the context of the zone should mean prohibiting nuclear weapons in the traditional forms, as well as the prohibiting attacks on nuclear installations. Intensive verification procedures based on the Latin American NWFZ Treaty model should be set up to ensure compliance with the treaties requirements and extensive cooperation in terms of surveillance should occur in order to support these procedures. It is precisely for this reason that extensive and far-ranging CBMs must accompany any attempts to reach an agreement on setting up a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone throughout the Arctic.
Pre-existing CBMs, combined with new CBMs, should be supported and enhanced in order to reduce the likelihood of military incidents in the Arctic. It is important to avoid actions and rhetoric that reduce confidence. The Arctic has been a scene of too many of these kinds of incidents in the recent past, most notably the planting of a titanium flag on the seabed of the North Pole. The Russians are not the only ones pulling public relations stunts in the Arctic, however.
Canada and Denmark have an outstanding dispute over tiny Hans Island. Michael Byers explains that "The Danes always leave a bottle of schnapps for us there, and we in turn leave them a bottle of Canadian Club". Added on top of these political stunts is an unhelpful political rhetoric.
We either use it or lose it. This kind of zero-sum rhetoric only seeks to harden the stance of the other political actors. It is unhelpful, as are actions by Russian flag planting and the burying of bottles of liquor. These actions threaten the NWFZ project by making scoring domestic political points contingent on bold and rash moves in the Arctic rather than for combating the threat that nuclear weapons pose. In addition to the previously mentioned New START and the Open Skies Treaty — which build confidence through weapon reductions coupled with verification procedures — the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic SAR Agreement helps build confidence through mutual cooperation and burden sharing to address a pressing problem for all Arctic states: emergency response.
Each state has chosen a specific national institution to take responsibility for SAR within their geographic area, and to establish formal links with their counter-parts from all of the other participating states. Receipt of this request must be acknowledged immediately, and permission either formally granted or denied as soon as is possible.
Future amendments to the SAR Treaty are expected as the participating states build up operation experience, and the Treaty has been drafted to anticipate and accommodate these updates. The Agreement must be properly resourced by the participating states. Some states — such as Canada - currently do not have the SAR resources in the Arctic to properly fulfill their treaty commitments, thus threatening the Agreement. To help address this resource gap, the newly created Arctic Council Secretariat — based in Tromso, Norway — should be tasked to monitor this developing SAR resource shortfall and push Arctic Council members to honour their commitment.
Signed in the early s, the INCSEA was a successful pioneering CBM between the United States and the former Soviet Union to moderate the then aggressive harassment tactics of their competing navies and aircraft, as they vied to assert themselves on the High Seas. Important CBMs within INCSEA include the giving of three to five days advance notice to the other party of any undertakings that might provide a danger to navigation or to aircraft and informing member vessels when submarines are exercising near them.
Also, INCSEA provides for annual meetings to review the implementation of the agreement, in which naval representatives from the member states can discuss issues directly. A multilateral INCSEA would help provide confidence to the Arctic states that the interaction of their ships and aircraft on the High Seas of the Arctic Ocean are regulated, and that the escalation of unforeseen events are prevented from escalating and undermining the perception of security in the region.
Militaries play the important role of aiding the civilian power, crucial given the harsh environment and rapid climate occurring in the Arctic. Militaries are used to support civil authorities in responding to natural and human-caused disasters, as well as serving search and rescue functions.
The later is becoming of growing importance because of the increase in air traffic transiting the area. The number of over-flights is expected to grow further upon Russia opening its northern airspace to international aviation. An excellent CBM would be to hold joint exercises between the militaries of the zonal states. For example, Danish officers have recently participated in a Canadian military exercise on Ellesmere Island. Additionally, the Canadian, American, and Russian militaries have begun to hold an annual military exercise, Vigilant Eagle, in the Arctic.
Such an exercise could be accommodated under the existing Partnership for Peace initiative. At a more basic level zonal states should notify one another before they undertake major military exercises within the territory covered by the zone and should invite other states to send observers, in incidences where the practising military does not wish to fully integrate foreign officers into their exercises for whatever reason. In addition to joint exercises, it may be in all Arctic countries interest to initiate a joint program of military research in the Arctic.
Much of the traditional military technology is unable to function fully under the extreme weather conditions which are found in the North. For instance, this paper has already explained how listening devices are not fully functional in the Arctic.
There are significant financial costs associated with developing new technologies. As a CBM, therefore, zonal states could share the financial burden of developing these technologies. Demilitarization is not a likely option for the Arctic, because of the role that militaries play in supporting the civilian authorities in this unique climate.
This should include such things as joint exercises and common research initiatives. A CBM that should be adopted to promote goodwill during the negotiations of the treaty for the NWFZ in the Arctic is for both Russia and the United States to stand down their nuclear weapons from high alert status.
The situation is extremely dangerous. These systems have almost failed on several occasions. The world is actually quite lucky that there has not yet been an accidental deployment of nuclear weapons, especially considering the very small window of time leaders have within which to make a decision to deploy weapons or not. In the United States, military personnel have only two to three minutes to determine if a warning that appears in the system in valid.
They then have ten minutes to locate and advise the President on the situation. This means that the total time from detection to deployment is approximately twenty-minutes. Twenty minutes to make a decision that will cause a foot deep, 1, foot diameter crater with a fire ball stretching half a mile in diameter taking hundreds of thousands of lives. There will be much to do for all the diplomats involved. In order to show a real commitment to the zone and to facilitate a positive relationship between the countries involved diplomatic resources for such a project should be substantial and sufficient to get the job done.
This could take the form of appointing an Ambassador for the Circumpolar Region by each of the countries involved. The Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador is not a new idea. Canada used to have this position before it was disbanded by the current Harper Government, and currently Russia and even France a non-Arctic state employ such Ambassadors. By appointing an Ambassador to specifically deal with Arctic-related issues, the countries of the region would be sending a strong message that the conclusion of a NWFZ and the implementation of the advised CBMs is a priority and will not be lost within all the other work that foreign ministries have going on.
Providing the opportunity for people-to-people contacts is an important CBM. These contacts need to happen at the elite level, but they also need to happen at the more grassroots level. Researchers should be encouraged to meet with other researchers from across the region and the Indigenous population should be encouraged to strengthen their ties with one another. Such people-to-people contacts, however, require consular services and support. This includes being assured access to the various regions, which has historically been an issue. For example, as late as the mids access to areas of Barents and Kara Seas was denied by Russia to Norwegian fishery research vessels.
There are an abundance of quality research facilities that are being built by the various Arctic governments and in the interest of collaboration researchers should have access to these facilities. However, increased people-to-people ties also require diplomatic and consular support. Action should be taken to strengthen consolatory presence across the region to provide support for those who wish to explore areas outside of their home in the Arctic. Furthermore, special visa arrangements should be made to facilitate cross-border exchanges where zonal states do not enjoy visa-free travel with one another, building on the positive example of the Bering Strait Regional Commission, which was set up in between the United States and the former Soviet Union.
Under the auspices of this organization, an agreement was signed in giving the Indigenous inhabitants from Iultinsky, Providensky, Chukotsky Rayons, and the eastern part of Anadyrsky Rayon in Russia the ability to travel visa-free for up to ninety days to Alaska.
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To facilitate the Saami vision and cross-border Arctic travel, an expansion of organizations like the Bering Strait Regional Commission should be underway. The first step towards doing this is a ratification of the relevant international agreements. Therefore, in order to ensure a peaceful resolution of the sovereignty disputes and thus create a positive environment for the conclusion of a NWFZ Treaty in the Arctic.
In addition to ensuring that the zonal states have ratified the relevant international treaties, it would also be a prudent CBM for Arctic states to harmonize regulations on issues that are of concern to all. This could include designing a common code for ship design for vessels operating within Arctic waters. Such a code would lay out the required hull thickness, engine strength and navigation equipment that vessels must have if they wish to transit the Arctic.
This code would work to reduce the likelihood of costly accidents in terms of both the environmental and human costs. However, such a code is of greater significance than simply trying to mitigate the chances of environmental disasters. That is what makes United States ascension so important. The basis for a total prohibition on transiting the Arctic with nuclear weapons might be found in Article , which states  :. Coastal states have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance.
Such law and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence . First, under this section, coastal states Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States have the right to make non-discriminatory regulations. It is likely that a regulation stating that vessels transiting the Arctic must not be in possession of nuclear weapons would be deemed acceptable under this provision.
Secondly, because the ice causes obstructions and hazards to navigation there is a need to come up with a common code for what kinds of vessels can transit this area. Those carrying nuclear weapons could be deemed to cause major harm. The Thule and Deline examples demonstrate the harm that can be done by nuclear materials to the fragile ecosystems of the North. The argument can be made that this would mean that all nuclear materials should be prevented from transiting the Arctic, not just those carrying nuclear weapons. However, this would preclude nuclear-powered icebreakers and those vessels carrying any nuclear material for peaceful purposes from transiting.
This would go against the right to the use of nuclear technology for peaceful civilian purposes that this paper advocates. The issue, though, is really one of scale. Consequently, Article of UNCLOS could be used to strengthen the design of ships, while at the same time preventing the transit of nuclear weapons.
Arctic states have proven themselves able to cooperate on matters of environmental protection through their joint adoption of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy in . While there is still much to be resolved in the jurisprudence around UNCLOS and its application to the Arctic, a reasonable argument can be made for justifying the limitation of transit with nuclear weapons under Article Throughout the s the international community provided substantial resources to Russia through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program CTRP and the G8 Global Partnership to safeguard against threats towards its nuclear material and waste, especially that which exists in the fragile Arctic environment.
The safe disposal of nuclear waste and safeguarding nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands remains a grave concern. The high costs associated with such programs necessitates that programs such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program be supported financially by zonal states, so that the benefits of a NWFZ can be fully realized.
This equally applies to nuclear waste. The size of the challenge of nuclear waste in the Arctic should not be underestimated. For example, a decommissioned Russian nuclear submarine sunk into the Barents Sea with ten crew on board, as well as two nuclear reactors. Despite the fact that Russian officials assured the international community that there were no nuclear weapons onboard, concerns remained about the danger of nuclear contamination. This incident was not isolated, three years previously a nuclear submarine, The Kursk, sank in the Barents Sea killing all crew onboard.
International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA data indicates that there are nuclear reactors in decommissioned submarines just waiting in the ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk waiting to be dismantled. Furthermore, the same agency estimates that there are more than tons of highly enriched spent fuel that needs to both be reprocessed and properly stored. Some estimate that there is enough uranium and plutonium in Russia to make 40, weapons. There are already eighteen nuclear reactors at the bottom of the ocean, which Russia dumped between and fully loaded with nuclear fuel.
These statistics are intended to reveal the sheer scale of the amount of nuclear waste in just the Russian Arctic and the enormity of the task of not only cleaning up this waste, but ensuring that it does not fall into the wrong hands. Upgrading the security of the nuclear icebreaker fleet fuel storage facilities in Russia has been the subject of international cooperation since Icebreaker fuel is thought to be weapon-grade uranium.
The psychological impacts that such an attack would have should not be underestimated. Under United Nations Security Council Resolution states are obliged to improve the security of their stockpiles and includes provisions to facilitate specialists being deployed to those countries that do not have the infrastructure or experience to deal with their stockpiles. This could form the basis for enhanced cooperation with Russia in securing its nuclear arsenal and nuclear waste in the Arctic. Another major problem in this regard is that the number of experts trained in nuclear-related issues is rapidly diminishing.
This is caused by the changing demographics of the aging workforce and the fact that recruitment has not kept up with the retirement replacement rates. The Three Mile Island and Chernobyl incidents made studying in the nuclear-related fields unpopular for a significant amount of time. This can be facilitated by joint educational programs. Such a program would not only assure that the costs of training are manageable, but will increase confidence because all zonal states will have access to the same nuclear-related information. The enormity of the nuclear waste problem that needs to be dealt with and the deadly consequences of not resolving the issue make it crucial that this issue is resolved.
All parties recognize the need to act, but the costs are prohibitive. Consequently, Arctic states should extend technical and financial assistance to Russia to address this issue. This investment will yield positive results by reducing the threat that the unsecure and untreated nuclear waste causes, while facilitating a positive relationship between Russia and the other Arctic states. For example, Canada and the United States have been working closely with South Korea to create a proliferation-resistant method of recycling spent fuel in what is known as the DUPIC process.
It is exactly this kind of technology that a NWFZ would facilitate sharing, because it meets the common objective of ensuring safety through effectively dealing with nuclear waste issues. Due to the importance of the Arctic region to the Russian economy another key CBM is strengthening economic integration through the region. This is to say that economic integration facilitates peaceful, because the costs of going to war and breaking these economic links would be too high. Developing the energy reserves of the Russian North is the key to the success of its economy.
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A possible means of facilitating this economic integration would be to establish an Arctic Chamber of Commerce that would attract business to the area. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council would also be an appropriate venue for undertaking these types of tasks. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council is an intergovernmental organization launched in to encourage cooperation in order to ensure long-term stability in political and other relations.
Its permanent secretariat, which was set up in , could serve as the organizational impetus to facilitate this economic cooperation. Whatever form this economic development takes it must be in congruence with Indigenous beliefs. This means respecting the health of the land, wildlife, plant and people. To summarize, vital to creating the political will necessary to reach a conclusion on the treaty are CBMs.
These measures will create the confidence and facilitate the cooperation that is required for countries to work together to rid the Arctic region of nuclear weapons. To ensure that these projects continue it would be best to include some CBMs within the treaty framework itself. While there are opponents to the idea of a NWFZ in the Arctic, on balance the support is with the idea.
The major players, Indigenous communities and civil society are all on board. States are looking for security. Many states still ascribe to the Cold War way of thinking that says that they are more secure when they live under a nuclear umbrella. If states believe that their security interests are better served by living within a zone without nuclear weapons, then they will sign on to the treaty with all of its incumbent rights and obligations.
While opponents do exist, there is a coalition of supports in the Canada, the Nordic countries, and yes, even in the United States and Russia. This directive was important because it elevated the posture of the Arctic within American foreign policy priorities, which has the potential to expand even further when the United States assumes the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in . This lends additional weight to the United States as an actor in Arctic cooperation and it is imperative that Washington shows leadership in moving towards an ANWFZ.
Support from the remainder of the Arctic states would likely be easily forthcoming if the United States and Russia are both seen to be onboard. None of the other Arctic states have nuclear-weapon capabilities. Both Norway and Denmark and therefore Greenland have committed to not positioning nuclear weapon devices on their territory during peacetime. All Arctic zonal states have expressed apprehension about nuclear weapons and have been supportive of the global abolition movement generally. They have signed on to all relevant international protocols that have sought to reduce international threats, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and actively support efforts internationally to have their provisions enforced.
Support from these states will likely be strong and sustained as long as the United States and Russia come to the table and that there is a chance of concluding a treaty, so that the time and energy of these small-to-medium states are not floundered on unattainable goals. It must be understood that the Arctic is not just a strategic region in the global campaign to abolish nuclear weapons. The Arctic is the homeland to several Indigenous groups who have maintained their way of life there since time immemorial.
Indigenous communities should be thoroughly involved in the negotiation of the NWFZ in a way that takes into account their own governance structures and philosophies even where this is not mandated by domestic law. Traditionally fears over the self-determination aspirations of Indigenous communities have precluded Traditional Knowledge TK from being incorporated into legally-binding international agreements applied to the Arctic.
Historically, Inuit organizations and councils have been supportive of denuclearization which gives hope that they would support this initiative. This is reflected in the formal resolution of the Inuit Circumpolar Council ICC supporting such an initiative, as this paper discussed in its first section. Creating public awareness is a precursor towards generating and sustaining the political will needed to initiate an ANWFZ. Civil society actors, such as the Pugwash Group, are making positive steps in this direction.
This group has already made calls for the creation of an ANWFZ in and is therefore a potential source of the civil society pressure needed to encourage government action. Public opinion polls indicate that there is already a strong global majority who are against the use of nuclear weapons. This indicates that there is a distinct possibility that there is enough civil society support to encourage politicians to take up the policy proposals cited in this paper. This must be achieved if the political will necessary to achieve the goal is to be found.
It is true that debates and negotiations on nuclear disarmament issues are often shut down outright by those who do not think that the major nuclear weapon states of Russia and the United States would be willing to ever give up their freedom to action with nuclear weapons. Such a view is overly deterministic. There has already been progress made towards restricting nuclear weapon use, including a plethora of arms control agreements — from the NPT Treaty to the recent New START - including the pledge by all five nuclear-weapon states to negative security assurances to not attack or threaten to attack with nuclear weapons those that do not have them.
It is also possible, as Hamel-Green has argued that even if Russia and the United States were not willing to include their territories within the zone that the remaining Arctic states could establish a NWFZ in their regions and continue to push the two nuclear weapons superpowers to join.
The UN criteria for NWFZ does not prohibit this kind of strategy, because it simply mandates that it is desirable that all states in the region are involved, not that they must be involved. While this is not an ideal solution, it is a means by which there can be forward progress, instead of standing still in the dangerous position which exists today. According to Wallace and Staples, these are:.
The content of a NWFZ Treaty should in no way disturb existing security arrangements or interfere with the rights of individual or collective self-defence guaranteed to states under Article 51 of the UN Charter. A zone should not affect the rights of the parties under international law to grant or deny transit privileges, including port calls and over flights. No restrictions should be imposed on the high seas, freedom of navigation and over flights by military aircraft, the right of innocent passage through archipelagic seas, and the right of transit through international straits.
Based on these criteria, it seems unlikely that the United States would sign on to the proposed ANWFZ, as all three conditions are contravened by the proposed treaty. The second and third are contravened because the goal of the zone is to deny transit to all vessels and aircrafts transporting nuclear weapons or weapons related materials.
This will require political leadership that is willing to use much political capital to accomplish this. However President Barack Obama has indicated that his outlook is amendable at least in entertaining the policy stance advocated in this paper. In Prague he outlined a vision of a world in which nuclear weapons would not have the prominent role that they do today, and has since worked towards this goal with New START.
Obama has proposed an extensive working program for the United States on nuclear non-proliferation which indicates a move in a positive direction. His working program includes reducing the US arsenal, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the national security strategy and promising to ratify the CTBT. His support for this initiative would be a legacy issue and he is best placed out of any President to conclude these types of negotiations.
From there these submarines can find sanctuary below the noisy ice of the relatively unmonitored Arctic Ocean. When viewed through the lens of nuclear deterrence, Russia can be expected to be extremely reluctant to give up these bases and the Arctic patrols of its nuclear ballistic submarines.
However one should bear in mind the time element of this paper; what seems likely improbable now could become possible later. The major goal of the short term action plan of this paper is to reduce the perceived need of nuclear weapons and the international prestige that comes with them. Indeed, it is not until the medium term action plan, after substantial advances in nuclear arms reduction and control measures, does the paper envision establishing an ANWFZ. While this paper focuses on the medium term, in the short term, the success of moving Russia towards accepting an ANWFZ would be greatly enhanced by positive framing and communications; minimizing the international prestige of nuclear weapons.
Communications and engagement strategies must be cognoscente of this fact in treating Russia as the great power that it is in the Arctic. There is a distinct Russian fear that they will lose their international status if they agree to reduce or eliminate their nuclear arsenals, and so to get Russia engaged there needs to be great sensitivity to this fact.
Consequently, instead of trying to get Russia to relinquish Great Powers ambitions, communication strategies and diplomatic interactions with Russia should emphasize that it can maintain its great power ambitions despite committing to an ANWFZ. The argument that it is necessary to get rid of all conflict and only then will it be possible to get rid of arms is fallacious. The presence of nuclear weapons encourages their use.
It is thus necessary to get rid of nuclear arms, because only then can there be a world without nuclear war. How do we move towards this goal? The first thing that needs to be done is to identify a forum in which the important questions related to this initiative can be discussed and debated, which all participants agree is a legitimate forum. While the Arctic states participate in many multilateral forums together, for the most part the Arctic is tangential at best to their activities. The most relevant forum, therefore, is the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council counts among its membership all of the Arctic states, as well as permanent representation from a number of Indigenous organizations.
However, the Arctic Council currently is prohibited from discussing security issues, because it was excluded from its original mandate in order to secure US buy-in. This provision is outdated and unnecessary. It should be immediately changed, so that the Arctic Council can begin debating the important issue of abolishing nuclear weapons from the region. This organization could get the ball rolling. It also shelters the Arctic states from undue interference or the complicating presence of non-zonal states during the initial stages of negotiation.
It is therefore recommended that the embargo on debating of security-related issues be lifted and that the Arctic Council become the organizational mechanism through which the NWFZ Treaty is debated. Once this is done it would be possible to expand negotiations to another forum in which all nuclear weapon states are engaged, which could perhaps be the proposed Office for Disarmament Affairs in the United Nations Secretariat that was proposed by Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon in . So long as any state has nuclear weapons, others will want them.
So long as any such weapons remain, it defies credibility that they will not one day be used, by accident, miscalculation or design. And any such use would be catastrophic for our world as we know it.
The Indigenous population whose home the Arctic is has been a proponent of this idea for some time and as the agenda develops it could be a powerful part of the second phase. Opponents would argue that the idea of making such a militarily strategic region free of nuclear weapons is utopian. It is true that at present the political will for concluding such a treaty does not exist. It is for that reason that this paper has proposed a variety of CBMs. These include: establishing joint Search and Rescue patrols, increasing diplomatic resources, harmonizing regulations, multilateral efforts to deal with nuclear waste, scientific cooperation, and economic integration.
These CBMs are designed to lay the groundwork for intensified cooperation among the Arctic states in order to create the environment in which a NWFZ Treaty becomes conceivable. The middle powers, like Canada and Norway, should also work hard to facilitate movement towards this treaty and as the Ottawa Process to Ban Landmines demonstrates, they can be successful. Civil society groups like Pugwash also have important roles to play in stimulating public opinion.
The Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone should cover all adjacent seas, sea beds, continental shelves, disputed territories, international waters and airspace of Canada, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. All zonal states and NATO should subscribe to a policy of non-First Use of nuclear weapons both during peacetime and wartime in the Arctic. Non-nuclear weapon states in the region should renounce the nuclear umbrella. The peaceful use of nuclear technology for civilian purposes should continue.
Verification procedures need to ensure that civilian nuclear technology is not being deferred towards weapon building capabilities. All nuclear weapons must be removed from the zone. There should be no new deployment of weapons. Transiting the zone with nuclear weapons should not be permitted. A permanent organization should be established to ensure verification of the rules and this organization should have the resources that it needs to operate fully.
Joint aerial patrols of the region should be carried out. An advanced underwater listening system built by and accessed to by all zonal states should be created. Information-sharing of relevant information should be commonplace. The place of nuclear weapons within the military strategy of the zonal states should not be replaced with another equally or more destructive Weapon of Mass Destruction WMD.
Measures that do not build confidence i. Both the United States and Russia should take their nuclear arsenals off high alert status. Nuclear Weapon States should unfix the guidance systems of their weapons from targets within the zone immediately. An Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs from each state should be appointed to handle negotiations. Consular services and support should be increased within the region and researchers and Indigenous Peoples should have simplified access to visas. The United States should ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the existing sovereignty disputes in the region.
A common code for ship design should be agreed upon in order to mitigate the chances of environmental damage. Financial and technical support for programs such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program that aims to safely dispose of nuclear waste in the Russian North should be forthcoming from all zonal states. The security of nuclear fuel storage facilities should be bolstered. Common training programs for nuclear officials should be initiated in order to create the people with the required expertise to carry out the other recommendations.
Economic integration should be encouraged. The rules of the Arctic Council should be amended to allow for debates concerning peace and security issues such as arms control. If the Arctic Council is unable to address these peace and security concerns, than another forum must be created which can discuss peace and security issues such as Arctic arms control. If it is not possible to get all Arctic states to ratify the NWFZ Treaty then those states which support the initiative should sign on to the treaty and continue to lobby non-signatories to sign on.
Akiba, Tadatoshi. Angus Reid. Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting. Archer, Clive. Arctic Council. Arctic Governance Project. Arms Control Association. Arctic Portal. Atland, Kristian. Barents Euro-Arctic Council. BBC News. Dead Arctic submariners are named. March 22, Russian submarine sinks in Arctic. August 30, Fleet gives Russia Crimean clout.
February 12, Bilt, Carl, and Radek Sikorski. Blix, Hans. Borgerson, Scott G. Burt, Richard and Queen Noor. Buckley, Adele. Burkharin, Oleg. Byers, Michael. Calamai, Peter. Canadian Pugwash Group. Canwest Mediaworks. Carnaghan, Matthew, and Allison Goody. Canadian Arctic Sovereignty. January 26, CBC News. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Chalecki, Elizabeth L. National Security.
Chretien, Jean. How to Prevent a New Cold War. May 6, The Globe and Mail. Chukota Autonomous Okrug. Coastal Response Research Centre. Durham: University of New Hamshire, CTV News. Curry, Bill. Vancouver: Simon Fraser University, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Deutche Welle. Dhanapala, Jayantha. Simon Fraser University Public Lecture. March 12, Ekeus, Rolf.
- PDF AND WORD FORMAT DOWNLOADs.
- Documents of the Conference 2010;
- Joan Littlewood (Routledge Performance Practitioners).
- Night Moves (Tom Clancys Net Force, Book 3).
European Commission for External Relaations. European Commission for External Relations. European Policy Centre.
International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament
Evans, Gareth, and Yoriko Kawaguchi. Federation of American Scientists. Fenge, Terry. Fenge, Terry, and Tony Penikett.
Is a World Without Nuclear Weapons Really Possible?
Fenge, Terry and Bernard W. Fisher, Roger and William L. London: Penguin Group, Fraser, Malcolm. Fraser, Malcolm et al. Friedheim, Robert L. Garton Ash, Timothy. Gibbs, Walter. Gizewski, Peter. Global Zero. Goldbat, Jozef. Gorbachev, Mikhail.