On your instructions I have been sitting beside this pond studying these tortoises every day for three years now. So you had better write in your Historia Animalium that they have been known to move for no reason. As part of your research you've planted some mechanical device in his heart that simply triggers the motor activity.
I am saying something entirely different: there just is no explanation. You are looking for excuses to abuse my professional standing. Animals, especially tortoises, are arbitrary creatures. There are some cases though not terribly many where they move this way or that, jump in the air or cross the mud, for no reason at all. It is a mistake to suppose that all cases can be forced into your pattern; some are simply intractable, and any good theory of animal motion must acknowledge this. T o say that all motions can be—even potentially—understood and explained is just a fashionable dogmatism.
It is not through researchers like B. And even if he does not see any, he may insist on holding it open as a conceptual possibility that there might be. It is from the conviction that B. Both of these, and Aristotle's view, are discussed at length in Essay 4. I am inclined to think that he would find B. If Aristotle's vaunted optimism for science means anything and it does not mean everything it has been taken to mean—cf.
Essays 2 and 4 it does mean that it is always appropriate to ask, " W h y this motion? Aristotle realizes, of course, that there are a number of ways this question might be answered. A main aim of the treatise will be to analyze and defend a certain kind of answer—the teleological—and to indicate its relationship to other answers.
And the treatise addresses itself to cosmological questions as well: the conditions for motion in the universe, the necessity of postulating an unmoved mover. Ill The MA is cryptic and brief, occasionally obscure. Essay 4. But it is from a study of its entire plan and argument, rather than from considering it bit by bit, that one can emerge with the most useful insights into the many problems with which it deals.
Because it is so full of allusions to other Aristotelian works, it cannot be interpreted without extensive analysis of parallel discussions and an attempt to see the problem in question as it emerges from Aristotle's work as a whole. One has to take a stand on some major issues in Aristotle's philosophy of science, ethics, and philosophy of mind before one can claim to have interpreted the MA.
The aim of the interpretive essays is to provide this kind of wide-ranging discussion of central problems, while leaving for notes textual, historical, and less central exegetical points. I have tried to make cross-references as extensive as possible, in order to minimize this problem for the reader. Short paraphrases were written by a number of mediaeval philosophers, among which those of Buridan and Burley have recently been edited, and are occasionally useful.
On all these, see the full discussions in my doctoral thesis, Part I, chapter 2. Among modern exegeses, most valuable are Farquharson's notes to his Oxford Translation. Notes are also provided by Torraca and Louis, and summaries of the argument can be found in Jaeger, "Pneuma," and During, Aristoteles, It is an introduction to the teleological arguments of the MA itself and has little to say directly about the treatise.
The second is largely devoted to some difficult exegetical questions in the MA and to some larger problems they raise for an understanding of Aristotle's philosophy of science. The aim is to explain the MA's odd blend of biological and cosmological argument, showing what questions it intends to answer and how it represents a modification of some earlier views about the interrelationships of the natural sciences. The third gives a general account of the MA's picture of the soul-body relation and attempts, using this as a basis, to resolve the treatise's most difficult exegetical dilemma, the problem of the sumphuton pneimta, or innate breath.
The fourth essay asks whether Aristotle believed that ethics could be made a deductive science and whether this is a good aim for the moral philosopher to have. Aristotle's use of parallels between practical and theoretical reasoning, and his theory of the practical syllogism particularly in its MA form are examined for the light they can shed on Aristotle's answers to these questions. The fifth essay, though less closely tied to the treatise itself than the others, proved necessary in order to provide an account, lacking in the literature, of the special role played by phemtasia in the accounts of action in the MA and in De Anima III.
The essay criticizes some standard empiricist notions about imagination, both on philosophical grounds and as readings of Aristotle, and argues that Aristotle gives us a more plausible and subtle account. Originally I had not intended to produce an entirely new critical edition of the MA text. But my examination of the tradition convinced me that this was necessary. A fully satisfactory analysis of the MS families had not been presented, and many difficult textual problems had received insufficient attention.
My extensive work on the manuscripts and the text is described in my article, "The Text of Aristotle's De Motu Animalium" which also includes some lengthy sections of commentary on the passages of the treatise that are most perplexing from a textual viewpoint. The MA was, until recently, held by many not to be genuine work of Aristotle. Since I shall in the body of this work assume its authenticity, I shall begin with a brief account of this debate. Essays 2 and 3 are more tightly linked to the treatise. This unpardonable omission in the original printing was justly castigated by reviewers.
I have been pleased and edified by the discussions that this edition has helped to occasion. It seems to me splendid, as well as quite just, that the De Motu should now be acclaimed as "one of the brightest jewels of the corpus" M. And it looks brighter than ever thanks to the close attention of many fine philosophers and scholars. At the end of this Preface I include a short annotated bibliography, mentioning longer reviews and related philosophical articles that seem to me to make a valuable addition to our understanding of the text.
I have here for the most part confined myself to work directly on De Motu and have not attempted to review the state of debate on the problems discussed in the Essays. Even here I do not aim at completeness; I am certain that I have omitted many valuable items. I omit, besides, all reviews that do not undertake to advance and defend some original view of the text. The De Motu was on the original list, and I was asked to defend it.
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To record the development of my views on each of the complicated issues mentioned in this book would be the job of another book, not another preface. A slightly different version of this chapter has been published as "The Common Explanation of Animal Motion. Issues about moral conflict mentioned in Essay 4 are a central theme of the new book as a whole.
One major issue must, however, be mentioned. In this book I ascribe to Aristotle the view that desire and belief have both a logical and a causal connection with action. I suggest that we might look for these items on the physiological level; and I speculate that Aristotle might be heading in that direction in chapter 7 cf.
I now believe that this is unsatisfactory, and that Aristotle's account is considerably stronger than I here say it is. The result seems to me, both philosophically and historically, to go beyond what is in this book on these particular issues. Argument to the effect that Aristotelian aisthesis is active and selective, rather than merely passive and receptive, should not be taken to tell against my account of phantasia. I point out that Aristotle does sometimes use 'aisthesis' in a narrower way, to refer to the non-active, non-phantastikon aspect of the general process: 'aisthesis', like 'phronesis1, is used by Aristotle in both a generic and a specific sense nn.
So passages that show that something Aristotle there calls aisthesis is active are fully compatible with my account of phantasia, and were meant to be cf. But my writing does not always explicitly make this point, and there are some claims about the insufficiency of aisthesis for the explanation of action that could easily be misconstrued in consequence. O w e n died suddenly at the age of sixty. H e inspired and continuously encouraged this book and all my work in the field from its very beginning.
It is difficult to express adequately my deep gratitude for his teaching, his example, and his friendship. If an already dedicated book can have, informally, an additional dedication, I should like to dedicate this edition to his memory. Journal of the History of Philosophy 20 : Barnes, Jonathan. The Classical Review 30 : Contains a series of suggestions on textual and philological points.
Bogen, James. Synthise 55 : Burnyeat, M. Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophic 63 : — Contains a detailed critical discussion of this book's position on the practical syllogism. Gotthelf, Allan. Journal of Philosophy 87 : , and Review of Metaphysics 35 : This extensive two-part article contains especially detailed discussions of teleology JP and function RM. Hardie, W. Aristotle's Ethical Theory. Moraux and J.
Argues that there are no stylistic reasons for impugning the authenticity of the De Motu. Kung, Joan. Nussbaum, M. Schofield and M. Cambridge: , Owen, G. London: Also in a Festschrift volume for David Balme, ed. Gotthelf, Pittsburgh: A detailed discussion of Aristotle's use of mathematical models in the scientific works—cf. Todd, R. Phoenix 34 : But in recent years defenders of the MA have argued that its acceptance into the Aristotelian corpus depends on our adopting a certain view about the order of composition of Aristotle's works. Questions of authenticity and of dating have been closely linked by both Nuyens and Torraca, 3 though they advance different views of Aristotelian chronology.
Let us first examine the arguments which have been used to deny authenticity, and point to general lines of defence. The first objection is based on the alleged absence of the MA 1 V. Rose, De Arist. The MA does appear in just the lists where its presence might be expected; it was excised from these for a time only because previous editors already believed it spurious. We do not expect to find the AL4 in the main portion of the catalogue preserved in Diogenes Laertius and Hesychius; none of the biological works—excepting the HA and the Amtomai, popular in the late Lyceum6—appears here.
Appendix A2 to the Hesychean catalogue— which, Moraux argues, was based on Andronicus's edition and composed in order to fill a lacuna in the older Ariston list10— mentions the MA along with the other major biological and physical treatises. The catalogue of Ptolemy, as preserved in two thirteenth-century Arabic versions, includes the MA among the major, genuine works, rather than with spuria or hupomnemata. Although the Arabic writers, ignorant of the MA indeed also of the IA and most of the PNn , conflate the MA title with that of the Anatomai, writing "On the Movement of Animals and their Anatomy," most editors agree in restoring two separate titles when the Greek version is reconstructed.
In the years immediately following the edition of Andronicus, Nicolaus of Damascus wrote a compendium of the biological works in nineteen books that included the MA; it is said explicitly by Averroes to have been his only source of information about its contents. DieSchule, V fr. During restated the case for the traditional attribution to Hermippus in "Ariston or Hermippus?
This argument is rejected utterly by Keaney, " T w o Notes," 6 1 : " T h e conclusion, that the catalogue is an old inventory which Hermippus used, is not only irrelevant to these arguments but actually contradicts them. If the catalogue is Alexandrian, the omission in it of works which Alexandrian scholars used and which the Alexandrian library possessed is impossible to explain. T h e MA is not directly cited all references to the MA listed in Lambros' index arc actually to the IA , but it contains none of the anecdotal information about particular species in which Aristophanes was interested.
T h e MA was probably a part of the collection to which he had access. Plezia has a good brief summary. Littig's reconstruction of the pinakes Andronikos is outdated, but still useful on some points. The post-Andronican origin is confirmed by the use of the title phusike akroasis cf. Simplicius, In Ph. The claim is that since the MA is late and spurious, Andronicus could not have included it.
Moraux, Aristotelismus, , and Averroes, Comm. But even he does not deny the interest of the treatise: "Insignis certe auctoris praeclara et diligens disputatio. It is true that the MA is "interdisciplinary" to an extent probably unparalleled in the corpus. But its heterogeneous contents are not just unrelated scraps of argument; they are parts of a carefully organized whole. Essay 2 will argue that the MA offers a view of the interdependence of the sciences that is a useful advance over Aristotle's earlier theories.
The most influential objection concerns the doctrine of pneuma in the tenth chapter. Rose insisted that the degree of importance accorded pneuma in the treatise was inconsistent with Aristotelian practice elsewhere. One can now consult the surveys of Beare, Ross, Peck, and, most recently, Balme for smilar verdicts. For a more extensive discussion of these allusions, see my doctoral thesis, chapter 2. Further references are in Essay 3. But Zeller18 claimed to find, in the sentence rls y.
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As I argue in a note ad he, there is no good reason to believe this. Other genuine passages will suit the reference better. And in general we have every reason to dissociate this careful and interesting treatise from the messy later work. Its claim that the soul is "in" the heart, which is the body's arche, was said by Poppelreuter in to be "vollig unaristotelisch. Essay 3 for discussion of these passages , but never suggested that there was any question of impugning the authenticity of all three of these works.
In the case of the MA, however, he concludes that we have only two choices: "Zeller, n. This enables him without difficulty to accept Jaeger's arguments based on the cross-references. It would be difficult to find any good reason to reject the MA because of the city simile. The links with the doctrine of the PN and of other biological works hold firm pace Rolfes , and no critic seriously considers impugning all of them.
I argue for the latter course in Essay 3. More general efforts along this line have been carried out by Block and Hardie. Some general considerations in favor of authenticity have been accepted by critics on both sides of the debate: the author is subtle and learned. Language and method are typically Aris- totelian. Jaeger's discussion of the cross-references also proves reassuring. Furthermore, the opening of the Sens.
And there are, in fact, ample grounds for associating the MA with the treatises of the PN. Most MSS of the Div. Jaeger, "Pneuma," Jaeger defends the authenticity of Aristotelian crossreferences which seem inseparable from context, and points out that forgery plays no part in the composition of the spurious treatises attached to the Aristotelian corpus. Almost all the references in the text of the MA are thoroughly integrated into the argument of the treatise; they provide evidence both of its authenticity and of its membership in a course of Aristotelian lectures on natural science cf.
There seems to remain no serious reason to question the treatise's claim to membership in the corpus.
Cross-references also provide our soundest criterion of the MA's relative date. Only the references in the final sentence of the treatise may possibly constitute a later addition, and even these may also give evidence of actual date of composition. If the common archetype of SO d did not place the MA as part of the I'N, the loss of the forward reference would be easily comprehensible. But it would fit neatly into his scheme, giving a result in keeping with those of Jaeger and Torraca. This clashes with Nuyens's theory of the development of Aristotle's psychology, but would be consistent either with Torraca's chronology or with a denial that the MA and the DA are theoretically incompatible.
Even Nuyens admits the lateness of the GA, which raises considerable problems for his thesis, and he offers us no way of accounting for the cross-references. I do not want to engage here in a lengthy critique of Nuyens's views. His critics have discredited crucial points in his argument, and articles by Owen and During have undermined the assumption, which he shares with Jaeger, that Aristotle began his career as a faithful Platonist and became progressively more independent.
It is dangerous to assume that in each work Aristotle set out to tell us everything he believed about a given problem, and fatal in the case of the MA, whose relation to the account of action in the DA is so clearly expressed by Aristotle himself. The whole project of much of the treatise is to bolster the arguments of Physics VIII by an analysis of animal self-motion. The treatise to which the MA seems closest, for several reasons, is, in fact, the GA.
The theory of pneuma, central in the MA, receives there its fullest exposition. This theory seems to be one that Aristotle began to develop relatively late in his biological writings, and that he was still in the course of developing. We may have further evidence for a late date in Moraux's suggestion34 that the works omitted from the list which he attributes to Ariston were those that were left unrevised at the time of Aristotle's death.
It seems likely, then, that the MA was written towards the end of Aristotle's second stay at Athens; it acknowledges its debt to previous biological writings dedicated to the explication of the physiology of particular species, and produces a unique synthesis of material previously discussed in separate works.
Moraux, Listes, T h e combined cross-references of the MA provide a summary of the entire series. The MA is extant in forty-four Greek manuscripts, many of which are of no importance for the text. Though there is some evidence that J once included the text of the biological works, this portion of the manuscript 1 12 "The Text of Aristotle's De Motu Animdium. For the MA we must rely on a number of later manuscripts of this family, which fall into fairly welldefined sub-groups.
In the indirect tradition, there is little of any use. However, when we examine the readings that separate the two families, we find that a has the better reading in only nine passages, b in twenty-four. As our knowledge of the b family increases, E's authority is diminished. In three passages for which Jaeger claims that a alone has the correct reading b5, b14, b 25 , three b manuscripts collated since his edition X, L, and H a also show the right reading; in another case M9 , N, a member of b, now joins the a manuscripts.
We should abandon once and for all the questionable procedure of preferring one of these families to the other in a general way; each passage must be judged on its merits. E Par. Y is a valuable independent witness. Where the two differ, E has the better reading in twenty-one passages, Y in twenty-eight of which five are differences of breathings only.
E is never alone in preserving the correct reading, but Y with V is alone at a V Vat. It is a badly damaged manuscript, with numerous corrections from a b manuscript and attempts at repair. Although it is for these reasons difficult to use, it can occasionally be helpful in confirming the reading of one a manuscript against another.
Also in b are the manuscripts used by Michael and Leonicus. Z O d was not consulted at all by previous editors of this treatise, but, although it is badly damaged, it seems to be superior to the much-used S, a better copy of a common source. Where the two differ, S has the better reading in only eight passages, O d in twenty-five. The symbol bi designates the shared readings of X Ambrosianus H 50 sup.
Z , s. Each of these three manuscripts appears to be an independent descendant of a common source. None can be neglected; and the family as a whole makes important contributions, especially at a26, where Jaeger's good emendation is confirmed. P Vat. W e can now confidently date it to the second half of the fourteenth century. This tradition is alone to preserve the right reading at a a very striking passage, deformed beyond recall in all other extant MSS , and b N, like P, is an extremely careless manuscript, but it can occasionally prove important in restoring the readings of b.
Michael of Ephesos, the twelfth-century commentator on the MA,6 used a b manuscript closely related to P but without P's independent source. The major source for his life and work is Grabmann, Guglielmo di Moerbeke. I have omitted many errors peculiar to a single manuscript, and some errors, obviously of no value, shared by two or three. I have been particularly brief wherever the correct reading is not in doubt. The claims of fidelity have therefore been ranked above those of elegance and naturalness.
Wherever some filling in seems necessary for any sense at all to emerge, my supplements are enclosed in pointed brackets cf. In three passages for which I have suggested deletions from the MSS text and justified these in the notes, I have retained the deleted words in square brackets for the reader's benefit b20, b l, b Essays 3 and 5 are devoted to these questions. For somewhat similar reasons, another Aristotelian term, alloiosis, has been given the literal translation "alteration," rather than the more interpretive "qualitative change.
H 50 sup. During, Gnomon 31 , HM8. Moraux, AntCl 28 , Platt, JP 32 , Cook Wilson, JP 32 , The precise line-divisions of the Bekker edition have been followed. Where my paragraphing differs from his, two lines will frequently represent one Bekker line. Now we determined before, in our discussion of eternal motion whether or not there is such a thing, and, if there is, what it is , that the origin of other movements is that which moves itself, that the origin of this is the unmoved, and that the first mover must necessarily be unmoved.
For it is clear in perceptible objects, too, that it is impossible for there to be movement if nothing is at rest—and, above all, in animals, our present concern. For if one of the parts moves, there must be some part at rest; and it is for this reason that animals have joints. And when the part is bending and being moved, one of the points in the joints is moved and the other remains at rest, just as if on a diameter AD should remain D fixed and B be moved, so as to give AC.
It is worth pausing to consider what has been said; for it has implications 10 extending beyond animals to the motion and course of the universe. For just as there must be something unmoved within the animal, if it is going to move, so even more there must be something outside the animal which is unmoved, supporting itself against which that which moves is moved.
Argument and Exposition
For if it gives way all the time, 15 as when tortoises walk in mud or men on sand, the creature will not advance, and there will be neither stepping, if the ground should not remain still, nor flying nor swimming, if the air or the sea should not offer resistance. And that which offers resistance must be other than that which is moved, and wholly different from the whole of it; and what is thus unmoved must 20 be no part of what is moved. If not, it will not be moved. TOIS iv rfj yfj ij seel.
For whether one blows the air out gently, or violently, so as to make a very great " wind, and whether it is breath or something else that one hurls or shoves, it is necessary, first of all, that one support oneself against some resting part of oneself when one pushes, and, further, that this part—either itself or that of which it is a part—remain at rest by 5 fixing itself against something outside it. The man who pushes the boat while he is himself standing in the boat and fixing himself against the boat naturally does not move it, since it is necessary that that against which he fixes himself remain still.
If, however, he pushes or pulls from 10 outside he does move it. For the ground is no part of the boat. K v KivtV ovOiv yap p,tpo wXoiov. For if it is moved itself and moves the heavens, it must touch something that is unmoved in order to impart the 15 movement, and this must be no part of the mover; and if the mover is unmoved from the first, it must, equally, be no part of what is moved. And on this point, at least, they are quite right who say that when the sphere is borne in a circle no part at all remains still; for it would be necessary either that the whole of it remain still, or that its continuity be torn asunder.
But they are not 20 right to ascribe power to the poles, which have no size and are termini and points. For besides the fact that nothing of this kind has any substance, it is impossible for a simple motion to be imparted by what is two; and wpa. Now those who, in the manner of story-tellers, represent Atlas with his feet on the earth would seem to have a rational basis for their use of the fable. They describe him as a kind of radius, whirling the heavens around the poles. Now this would be quite reasonable, 30 since the earth remains still.
But if they give such an account they must concede that the earth is no part of the universe. Further, the forces of that which causes movement and of that which remains still must be made equal. For there is a certain amount of force and power in virtue of which what remains remains, just as there is of force in virtue of which the mover imparts motion.
And equal forces are unaffected by one another, but they are overcome by a superiority of force. So Atlas, or anything similar that b imparts movement from within, must exert a pressure no greater than the fixedness with which the earth remains stable, or the earth will be moved away from the center, out of its proper place.
For just as the pusher pushes, so the pushed is pushed—i. But that which imparts the motion starts out by being at rest, so that its force must be greater than, rather than similar and equal to, its own stability, and, similarly, greater than the stability of that which is moved but does not impart movement.
De Motu Revisited
Then the earth's power of stability will have to be as great as that of the whole heavens and that which moves them. Kivovfxeva tjyvaiv 8vo rroiovaiv. Xeyovaiv Kai Svvdp. For if someone could overcome by power of motion the stability of the earth, it is clear that he would move it away from the center. And it is obvious that the force from which this power would derive is not infinite. For the earth is not infinite, so its weight is not either.
Now "impossible" has several senses: for when we say it is impossible to see a sound and for us to see the men in the moon, we use two different senses of the word. The former is invisible of necessity; the latter, though of such a nature as to be visible, will not actually be seen. And we believe that the universe is imperishable and indestructible of necessity; but the result of this argument is that it is not so of necessity.
For it is natural and possible for there to be a motion greater than that in virtue of which the earth remains stable, and in virtue of which fire and the body above are moved. If, then, there are overwhelming motions, these bodies will be destroyed by one another. And if there are not, but might possibly be since there could not possibly be an infinite motion, because it is not even possible for a body to be infinite , it would be possible for the heavens to be dissolved.
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For what prevents this from happening, if it is not impossible? And it is not impossible unless the opposite is necessary. Let us, however, discuss this problem further another time. And must this necessarily hold true of the universe as well? For it looks as if it would be paradoxical if the origin of motion were inside. JV re vijv aSvvaTOv ap. Lay hold of the rope, all you gods and goddesses. TO yap oA For what is wholly unmoved cannot possibly be moved by anything. But concerning lifeless things that are moved, one might wonder whether all have in themselves both that which is at rest and that which imparts movement, and whether they, too, must support themselves against something external which is at rest.
For all lifeless things are moved by something else, and the origin for all the things moved in this way is something that moves itself. But whether there is something higher, which imparts 20 motion in a primary way, is unclear, and we will give a separate account of this sort of origin. Htpl viiTai p. T0 TO.
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For there is no difference between hurling a large weight and a small one, as people do when they spit and cough and inhale and exhale. Now the question of original generation and decay is different. For if there is, as we hold, a primary motion, this would account for generation and decay, and, in- 30 deed, possibly for all other sorts of motion. Just as in the universe, so in the animal this is the primary motion in the completed creature; so that it sc. But otherwise i. The first growth and alteration, however, take place by another's agency and through other 35 means.
And it is in no way possible for anything to be responsible for its own generation and decay. For the 7oob mover must preexist the moved, and the begetter the begotten. But nothing is prior to itself. Since all lifeless things are moved by something else, and since we have set forth in our work on first philosophy our views concerning how the first and eternally moved is moved, and how the first mover imparts motion, it remains for us to consider how the soul moves the body, and what is the origin of 10 an animal's motion.
Hence all their movements have a limit; for so do the motions of living creatures. For all animals both impart movement and are moved for the sake of some- 15 thing, so that this is the limit to all their movement: the thing for-the-sake-of-which. Now we see that the movers of the animal are reasoning and phantasm and choice and wish and appetite. And all of these can be reduced to thought and desire.
For both phantasia and sense-perception hold the same place as thought, since 20 all are concerned with making distinctions—though they differ from each other in ways we have discussed elsewhere. Wish and spiritedness and appetite are all desire, and choice shares both in reasoning and in desire.
So that the first mover is the object of desire and also of thought; not, however, every object of thought, but the end in the sphere of things that can be done. So it is clear that the 30 movement of the eternally moved by the eternal mover is in one respect similar to that of any animal, but in another respect dissimilar; hence the first is moved eternally, but the movement of animals has a limit.
Reading Aristotle Argument and Exposition. Editors: William Wians and Ron Polansky. Contributors demonstrate that Aristotle relies on both explanatory and expository principles. Expository principles are at least as important. They pertain to proper sequence, pedagogical method, the role of reputable views and the opinions of predecessors, the equivocity of key explanatory terms, and the need to scrupulously observe distinctions between the different sciences.
A sensitivity to expository principles is crucial to understanding both particular arguments and entire treatises. Author: Gijsbert Jonkers. In The Textual Tradition of Plato's Timaeus and Critias, Gijsbert Jonkers provides new insights into the extant ancient and medieval evidence for the text of both Platonic dialogues. The discussions are set in the broader context of examinations in recent decades of the textual traditions of other individual Platonic works. Particularly the vast collection of testimonia of the Timaeus , one of Plato's most read, interpreted and discussed dialogues of all times, will be of interest for students of ancient philosophy, science and philology.
Author: Jeroen Lauwers. This is thus as yet the first book-length attempt at situating the historical communication process implicit in the surviving Maximean texts in the concurrent context of the Imperial intellectual world. Aristotle here works consistently with a co-ordinate triad in his explanations of the cognitive input into animal behaviour: sense-perception, phantasia , and intellect or thinking.
Contrary to some interpretations, phantasia is not treated in this context as more general or fundamental than sense-perception. Sense-perception and phantasia can each produce psychophysical reactions — but in ways that are simply different from each other. Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
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